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Abstract 
Traditionally, liquidity measurement is an integral part of financial statement 
analysis, particularly in credit risk measurement. However, most liquidity 
ratios are estimated based on historical data, which is a backward looking 
estimation. They have high reasoning power, but less predictive power. In 
this thesis, by applying the Merton model, we introduced a new liquidity 
measurement - insolvency probability, measuring the probability that a firm 
may suffer insolvency. In addition, we also figured out the tradeoff between 
profitability and insolvency risk in term of liquidity, so as to help a firm to 
determine its optimal liquidity level using optimization technique. In this 
thesis, we aimed at providing a new aspiration in measuring, handling and 
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In this dissertation, we aimed at providing a new aspiration in measuring, 
handling and monitoring liquidity risk. 
To highlight the fundamental objective of liquidity management, we need 
to distinguish between bankruptcy insolvency and technical insolvency. In 
turn, bankruptcy insolvency occurs when a firm's total liabilities exceed its 
total assets. Once it happens, there is a high possibility that the firm declares 
bankruptcy. Technical insolvency occurs because of lacking cash to repay the 
liabilities while the firm assets value still higher than its liabilities. When 
comparing with bankruptcy insolvency, technical insolvency focuses more on 
operational side and it is more practical. Therefore, throughout this thesis, 
we set our focus on the technical insolvency, instead of bankruptcy insolvency. 
To measure liquidity risk, traditionally, financial ratios in financial state-
1 
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merit are used, including the current and quick ratios and various working 
capital turnover ratios. However, they are not very effective because they do 
not cover all the factors that affecting a firm's short-term insolvency risk. 
Therefore, this thesis aims at exploring a new liquidity measurement, 
insolvency probability, to replace those financial ratios. In order to do so, we 
apply the Merton model, which is commonly used in default prediction, to 
measure the insolvency risk. In our proposed model, we define insolvency 
risk as the probability that the firm has insufficient liquid assets^ to repay 
the short-term debts at maturity. The liquidity ratio - liquid-to-total assets 
ratio, plays a critical role in the risk measurement. 
The proportion of investment in liquid assets is a function of variability 
in cash demands and the risk preferences that selected by management. If 
a firm could determine its future obligations with higher certainty or higher 
accuracy, it is unnecessary to hold excessive liquid assets. However, the 
existence of uncertainty causes management to hold more liquid assets to 
avoid insolvency risk. Such risk can result from an unforeseen cash drain 
that forces management to dispose profitable illiquid assets at unattractive 
prices, or worse, the necessity to declare bankruptcy. 
The appropriate level of liquidity provides adequate availability and safe-
keeping functions under varied economic conditions. This decision is influ-
1 Liquid assets are defined as cash plus marketable securities held by the firm. 
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enced by a tradeoff between profitability and insolvency risk. A low level of 
liquid assets results in a higher earning power, but also higher risks. On the 
other hand, a high level of liquid assets is safe against unforseen risks, but 
forgoing future profits. 
In this thesis, we develop a model to capture the relationship between 
profitability and insolvency risk based on the a firm's liquidity level. The 
motivation is that such a model is able to consider both the benefits and 
costs in holding liquid assets. Further more, we will introduce a new concept, 
Expected Return with Liquidity Adjustment (ERLA), so as to determine the 
optimal liquidity level that a firm should hold, by optimization technique. 
Besides, three liquidity strategies will be suggested to the management in 
monitoring a firm's liquidity risk continuously. Using simulations, scenarios 
analysis is carried to figure out the characteristics of those strategies. 
The rest of the thesis will be presented as follows. Chapter 2 is the back-
ground study about liquidity management and default prediction, especially 
Merton model is discussed in details. Chapter 3 introduces our proposed 
liquidity measurement, insolvency probability. Chapter 4 figures out the 
relationship between profitability, liquidity and insolvency risk. Chapter 5 
discusses how to determine the optimal liquidity level of a firm. Chapter 6 
suggests three liquidity strategies and carries scenarios tests. Finally, this 
thesis is concluded in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 2 
Background Study 
In this chapter, overview of liquidity management and default prediction 
analysis are introduced. And some of the related research on these topics 
will also be reviewed. The Merton model, the foundation of many currently 
used default prediction models, will briefly be discussed in the last section of 
this chapter. 
2.1 Liquidity Management 
Liquidity management is the allocation of liquid assets over time to meet re-
sources required for repaying the obligation that due on time and for various 
investments that management undertake to maximize shareholder wealth. 
This definition emphasizes the dynamic nature of liquidity management. 
4 
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That is, the providing of resources at times when they are needed and the 
control of various financial risks, especially those related to insolvency risk. 
The key issues in liquidity management include how much to invest in 
liquid assets, how much to reserve for paying short-term liabilities, and how 
to manage these investments effectively and efficiently in order to minimize 
the insolvency risk. Although the ability in repaying obligations in cash is the 
criterion of solvency, management do not seek to holding cash, because idle 
cash is unprofitable. In allocation of financial resources, many complicated 
factors need to be considered and many difficult decisions must be made. 
The two most prominent literature on the optimal amount liquidity sug-
gested that firms should either hold large amount of liquid assets or no liq-
uid assets. Myers and Majluf (1984) stated that resulted from information 
asymmetry-induced financing constraints, firm should stock up on liquid as-
sets to finance future investment with internal capital. Since there were no 
offsetting costs to hold liquid assets in their model, the optimal amount of 
liquidity was a partial solution. In contrast, Jensen (1986) stated that firm 
should be forced to pay out funds in excess of the amount that necessary to 
finance all positive Net Present Value (NPV) investments to minimize the 
agency cost^ of free cash flow. In the absence of a benefit from liquid as-
^As management is usually more risk-averse than shareholders, they tend to prefer a 
higher liquidity. 
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sets, Jensen's analysis implied that the firm would optimally carry no liquid 
assets. However, both literature or models have their limitations in that sev-
eral assumptions made in supporting the development of the model did not 
consider the complexity of the problem in liquidity management. 
Kim et al. (1998) provided empirical supports for the theoretical "trade-
off between low return on liquid assets and the benefit of minimizing the need 
for costly external financing". The model predicted that the optimal invest-
ment in liquidity was increasing in the cost of external financing, the variance 
of future cash flows, and the return on the future investment, while it was 
decreasing in the return difference between physical assets and liquid assets. 
They found that firms with more volatile earnings and lower returns on phys-
ical assets relative to those on liquid assets tended to have significantly larger 
positions in liquid assets. Our analysis also includes both benefits and costs 
of holding liquid assets to develop prediction about the optimal position of 
corporate liquidity. 
Opler et al.'s results (1999) indicated that: (1) firms with stronger growth 
opportunities; (2) firms with riskier activities, and (3) small firms, hold more 
cash than other firms. On the other hand, firms that have greatest access to 
the capital market, such as large firms and those with credit ratings, tend to 
hold less cash. 
Bruinshoofd and Kool's study (2002) showed that long-run corporate liq-
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uidity targets existed and were based on a small number of firm characteris-
tics. Short-run target adjustment efforts were considerable and statistically 
significant. Additionally, in the short-run, liquidity responded to exogenous 
shocks, but passive liquidity behavior did not extend to the long-run. They 
concluded that corporate liquidity was an actively managed financial ratio. 
The aforementioned literature estimated the optimal liquidity mainly 
based on the information from financial statements. However, financial state-
ments only provide a snapshot of the firm's financial position at a point in 
time. In real practice, the future is uncertain. A firm's liquidity position 
fluctuates from day to day. Traditional analyzes fail to predict the future 
since they highly rely on historical information. Therefore, in our model, 
we adopt a forward looking and going-concern approach to measure firms' 
liquidity risk. Besides, we propose an optimization method to estimate the 
firm's optimal liquidity level. 
2.2 Default Prediction Analysis 
Research on default prediction have been conducted for many decades and 
a large number of empirical studies have been published since the pioneer-
ing work of Fitzpatrick (1932). He compared the values of financial ratios 
of bankruptcy firms with those of non-bankruptcy firms and concluded that 
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significant differences existed. Later on, Beaver (1966) introduced Univariate 
Discriminant Analysis to support default prediction. He studied and ana-
lyzed 158 firms during 1954-1964，and found that six financial ratios could 
be used to distinguish bankruptcy firms from those non-bankruptcy firms. 
Altman et al. (1968), Deakin (1972) and many other researchers ex-
panded Beaver's analysis to Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA). They 
derived the linear combination of two or more independent variables that 
would discriminate the best between bankruptcy firms and non-bankruptcy 
firms. It did very well provided that the variables followed multivariate nor-
mal distributions and the covariance matrices for each group were equal. 
However, empirical experiments have shown that such assumptions might be 
questionable, especially, bankruptcy firms violated the normality condition 
and the equal group variances condition was also violated. 
Other statistical techniques have also been introduced, such as Probit 
and Logit Analysis (Ohlson (1980)) and Neural Networks (Tarn and Kiang 
(1992)), etc. Review studies on default prediction can be found in Dimitras 
et al. (1996), Back et al. (1996) and Crouhy et al. (2000). 
The general conclusion from these extensive research efforts suggested 
that each study by itself only provided a reasonable discrimination between 
bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy firms in a limited or particular scope. But, 
perhaps more significantly, is that the various studies hardly showed any 
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agreement on which factors were important in default prediction. Indeed, 
empirical research on default prediction failed to produce agreement on which 
variables are good predictors and why. This discord of conclusions can partly 
be attributed to the fact that the studies referred to different periods, differ-
ent countries, and different industries. 
Therefore, aforementioned models are not commonly used in the bank-
ing industry. Instead, currently used approaches, for example, KMV Model 
(1993) and CreditMetrics (1997), were based on option pricing approach, in-
troduced by Merton (1974). In the model, the default process is endogenous, 
and is related to the capital structure of the firm. Default occurs when the 
value of the firm assets fall below some critical levels. The merit of this 
approach is that each case can be analyzed individually based on its unique 
features. 
Banks and credit agencies adopt many different default prediction models 
in measuring firms' creditworthiness. However, most of the models do not 
incorporate liquidity and insolvency risk. Even though some models may 
incorporate liquidity ratios, they are not very effective because those tradi-
tional financial ratios only provide an overview of liquidity. Therefore, in our 
model, we propose a dynamic liquidity measurement, built on Merton model, 
in supporting the credit measurement. 
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2.3 The Merton Model 
Merton (1974) was the first to demonstrate that a firm's default option could 
be modelled with the methodology that developed by Black and Scholes 
(1973). He showed that equity value could be considered as a call option on 
the firm assets with the strike price equals the face value of a single debt 
issue. 
The major assumptions of such model include: 
• The markets are frictionless with no taxes and without bankruptcy 
costs; 
• The firm has a single issue of debt outstanding and the debt is of zero-
coupon form; and 
• The only sources of firm financing are the single debt and equity. 
Based on the above assumptions, the market value of the firm assets {V) is 
simply the sum of 
• The market value of the firm equity {E), which is assumed to follow a 
geometric Brownian motion; and 
• The market value of the single zero-couple debt (_D)，with face value D 
and mature at time t. � 
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When the debt matures at time t, equity-holders have the residual claim 
on the firm assets after the debt is paid. If there is enough assets value to 
meet the payment, i.e., Vt > D, equity-holders receive the residual, Vt _ D. 
However, if the assets value is insufficient to meet the obligation (i.e., Vt < 
D), debt-holders receive the whole firm assets Vt and equity-holders receive 
nothing. 
Therefore, the equity's payoff at maturity is max[Vt — •D’ 0]. The residual 
claim of equity-holders is simply the payoff from holding a long position in 
a call option on the firm assets with strike price D and maturity time t. 
Therefore, the equity value could be treated as the value of such a call option. 
Under the Black-Scholes (BS) assumptions, the equity value can be cal-
culated by 
E = VN{di) - e-''DN{d2) (2.1) 
where 
cr is the volatility of the firm assets, 
r is the risk free interest rate, 
t is the time to maturity of the debt, and 
N{x) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
Merton assumed that the assets value under the risk-neutral probability 
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measure is a geometric Brownian motion, that is 
2 
\nVt = \nV + {r- + aVie (2.2) 
Zi 
where e is the random component of the assets, (e �iV(0，1)). 
The firm defaults when the assets value falls below the debt value at 
maturity. Therefore, default probability (p) can be calculated by 
p = <D] =尸[In Vt <\nD]. (2.3) 
Combining Equations (2.2) and (2.3), we have 
- 2 -
p = P ln\/ + ( 卜 + < lni:> 
Zi 
= / [ - i n 务+ ( ; - • > � 
GsTt 
As the random component of the assets is normally distributed, that is 
{e �N(0,1))，the default probability can be defined in terms of the cumula-
tive normal distribution 
厂 W p n 务+ ( 7 办 1 二 例—办). (2.4) 
(jyt 
The advantage of Merton model is that it utilizes stock price data that are 
predictive and highly responsive to changes in the firm's financial condition. 
Instead of relying on historical data, it adopts a forwarding looking approach. 
However, problems immediately appear when attempting a practical im-
plementation of Merton model: 
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1. The firm assets (V) and its volatility (ay) are central on determining 
the default probability, but both are unobservable. 
2. The model assumes a very simple debt structure. But in reality, debt 
structures tend to be far more complex. A firm may contain many 
short-term and long-term debts with different maturities. 
For the first problem, although the assets value and its volatility are 
unobservable, it is possible to use prices of traded securities issued by the 
firm to identify these quantities. Specifically, the firm is publicly traded with 
observable equity prices. 
As the equity value is a function of the assets value, we can use Ito's 
lemma to determine the instantaneous equity volatility (a丑)from the assets 
volatility (oy), that is 
(JE 二� l H c h ) a v . (2.5) 
With Equations (2.1) and (2.5), given data on the stock price, the number 
of shares outstanding, the face value and maturity time of the debts, as well 
as the risk free interest rate, the two unobservable variables V and oy can 
be identified. 
For the second problem, Merton model assumes the simplicity of the 
capital structure. Since capital structures in practice are far more complex, 
the two widely used alternatives from an implementation standpoint are: 
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1. Extend the theoretical structure of the model so that it can handle 
more complex debt structures, such as, Geske model (1977). 
2. Simplify reality to make it fit within the existing model, for example, 
KMV model (1993). 
Chapter 3 
Insolvency Model 
Liquidity measurement is an important component of credit analysis or firm 
value analysis. Analysts measure liquidity to assess firm creditworthiness and 
to monitor the insolvency risk of the firm. For either purpose, this assessment 
must be based on a measure that is practical, understandable, and reliable 
as an indictor of a firm's ability to repay its short-term obligations. 
The traditional financial ratios used to measure liquidity include the cur-
rent and quick ratios and various working capital turnover ratios. These 
measures have been popular because they are familiar and easy to calculate 
and apply. Unfortunately, they are not very effective because they fail to 
account for all the factors that affect a firm's short-term insolvency risk. 
In this chapter, we propose an insolvency model which measures the prob-
ability that a firm has insufficient liquid assets to repay the short-term debts. 
15 
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Besides, the factors that affecting the insolvency probability will be figured 
out and their effects will be examined. 
3.1 Insolvency Probability 
Firms maintain liquidity as a means of meeting near-term known and un-
expected requirements for net cash outlays, such as, unanticipated invest-
ment opportunities and unanticipated expenses. A firm may have to delay 
payments, sell assets, forgo profitable investment opportunities, or obtain 
temporary financing at unfavorable terms if its ability to meet these cash 
requirements is inadequate. Therefore, a firm's liquidity position fluctuates 
randomly. Given certain assumptions, we can model a firm's liquidity as a 
random process. Such a model provides the basis for measurement of a firm's 
insolvency risk. 
There are three assumptions in our model. The first is that there is a 
time horizon over which a firm's liquidity position is a matter of concern. 
The length of this horizon {t) may vary from firm to firm, according to the 
maturity of near-due short-term debts (less than one year). The important 
factor in defining the horizon is that there is no refinancing during the time 
interval. 
The second is that the value of a firm assets follows geometric Brownian 
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motion, that is the firm value fluctuates randomly from day to day. This 
assumption is the basis to apply Merton model. Under the risk-neutral as-
sumptions, Equation (2.2) holds. However, for the general case, when the 
assumption is removed, the assets value, Vt, given that the value at time 0 is 
V, equals 
2 
\nVt = \nV-\-(fj,-^)t-{- (jyfte (3.1) 
where is the expected rate of return on assets. 
The final assumption is that, during the time horizon, the firm maintains 
a target proportion of liquid assets to total assets, we define as liquidity 
ratio (c). Empirical analysis of Bruinshoofd and Kool (2002) provides clear 
evidence for the existence of firm liquidity targets. This assumption conforms 
to the fact that firm liquidity is an actively managed finance ratio. Although 
the liquidity position may vary in short run, management may take actions 
so that the position converges to a target value. It is possible to those firms, 
whose liquidity demands are proportional to their firm sizes. When the firm 
size increases (decreases), the management will increase (decrease) its liquid 
assets that converges to its liquidity target. It is because insufficient liquidity 
rises the insolvency risk. However, excess liquidity reduces the profitability 
of the firm as they have less earning power. Therefore, management strive 
to maintain a balance，so that a target liquidity level can be reached. 
The above assumptions allow us to describe liquid assets value as a prod-
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uct of the liquidity ratio (c) and the assets value (V )^, that is cV. And the 
fluctuation of the liquid assets value is a random process. The firm will suffer 
technical insolvency if the liquid assets value falls below the short-term debts 
value (Ds) at maturity (t). 
By applying Merton model, we value the Insolvency Probability (p) as 
p = P [cV^  <Ds] = P [in Vt < In (3.2) 
L C J. 
Combining equation (3.1) and (3.2), we have 




� I n f + 苦)t] , � 
= N ——込^^ (3.3) 
cry/t 
Based on Merton model, we have derived a model to capture a firm liq-
uidity, and at the same time, its insolvency risk. In our model, the liquidity 
ratio (c), which is actively controlled by the management, pays a key role in 
determining the insolvency probability. 
This liquidity measurement has several important characteristics. First, 
our model is useful for both internal and external applications. For internal, 
management can apply the model to decide its liquidity level with acceptable 
insolvency probability. For external, credit analysts can apply the model to 
measure a firm liquidity in order to assess the firm creditworthiness. 
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Second, our model is understandable since it is designed to estimate the 
probability that a firm will be unable to pay its short-term debts. It is more 
meaningful when comparing with traditional financial ratios, for example, an 
analyst cannot say that a firm with a current ratio of 1:1 is twice as likely to 
be insolvent as a firm with a ratio of 2:1. Insolvency probability is easier to 
explain and acceptable to analysts and management. In addition, our model 
also adopts a forward-looking approach, we try to predict the future, instead 
of looking backward. 
Lastly, our model is practical because it can be computed from the market 
information. The short-term debts value and the maturity can be obtained 
from financial statements. Many published literatures have suggested meth-
ods in estimating the value and volatility of a firm assets. Although the 
expected rate is difficult to estimate, we will propose a method in Chap-
ter 4. Prom internal side, the target liquidity ratio is determined by the 
management, while external side may estimate by historical average value. 
3.2 Factors Affecting Insolvency Probability 
As we have stated before, another weakness of traditional financial ratios is 
that they fail to account for all the factors that affecting a firm's liquidity. 
The amount of financial resources available in times of distress is the first fac-
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tor that affects a firm's liquidity. These resources must be quickly convertible 
into cash to ensure that the firm can meet an unexpected requirement for 
funds. Furthermore, such conversion must not disturb operations so future 
liquidity will not be impaired. Liquid assets, that is cash plus marketable 
securities, are the principal resources that meet these requirements and must 
be included in the liquidity measurement. 
The second factor is the uncertainty to the future. The liquid assets value 
fluctuates depending on the daily net cash flow. The greater the possibility 
that actual cash inflows are smaller than expected or actual cash outflows 
are larger than expected, the more risky it is the given liquidity position. 
Insolvency probability has fewer limitations than traditional measure-
ment, because it accounts for the above factors. From Equation (3.3), insol-
vency probability (p) depends on the following six variables, they are 
1. Liquidity ratio (c) 
2. Short-term debts value {Dg) 
3. Assets value (V) 
4. Expected rate of assets return (/x) 
5. Volatility of the assets (cr) 
6. Time to maturity {t) 
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Liquidity Ratio 
The liquidity ratio directly describes a firm's liquidity position at a time, 
reflecting how much liquid assets are currently held by the firm. Obviously, 
the more liquid assets, the higher the repayment possibility of the obligation. 
Therefore, the insolvency probability should be strictly decreasing as the 
liquidity ratio increases (Figure 3.1). 
V = 1 0 0 , D ^ - 1 5 , n - 0 . 2 ’ CT - 0 . 3 , t =• 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
\ -
0 . 8 - \ -
I � . 6 - \ -
1 0 . 4 - \ -
0.2 - \ -
° 0 0 . 0 5 0 .1 0 . 1 5 0 . 2 0 . 2 5 0 . 3 0 . 3 5 0 . 4 
Liquidity Ratio (c) 
Figure 3.1: Insolvency probability versus liquidity 
By differentiating equation (3.3) with respect to c, we have the first deriva-
tive, 
塞 = 偷 ( - ( 3 . 4 ) 
where 
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"Wt ’ 
2 
r}{z) = is the standard normal density function. 
And the second derivative is, 
s = * " ) • ( - • ) � ( " ) • 
= 畠 . M - 今 （3.5) 
This is positive if and only if 
a V i - d > 0 
cV ( 
I n 瓦 + 卜 计 〉 。 
c > (3.6) 
So p is convex in c if Equation (3.6) holds, and for 
c < 令 e 如 ( 3 . 7 ) 
the function is strictly concave. 
Note that the largest rate of decrease in p is at the inflection point q, 
(Figure 3.2) 
Q = � - ( " + 4 ) 丨 . (3.8) 
When the liquidity ratio increases from 0 to q, the insolvency probability 
decreases with an increasing rate significantly. After q and approaches to 1， 
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Figure 3.2: Curvature of insolvency probability versus liquidity 
the insolvency probability decreases with a decreasing rate and the effect be-
comes less significant. Therefore, it suggests management should not increase 
the liquidity ratio blindly. At the same time, blindly increasing the liquidity 
also implies forgoing the investment of highly profitable long-term assets. A 
trade-off between liquidity and profitability does exist. We will discuss more 
about the relationship between liquidity and probability in Chapter 4. 
Short-term Debts Value 
The short-term debts value represents the amount of the obligations that 
the firm faces, which is, different from current liability. Current liability is 
commonly used in the traditional financial ratios. However, it is a poor sub-
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stitute for cash requirements. Firms always keep certain amount of current 
liability, for example account payable, in the accounting book. Debts are 
obligated to repay at the maturity, otherwise, the firm defaults. As a result, 
short-term debts value is more meaningful in the liquidity measurement. And 
the value is directly affected the insolvency risk. The higher the value, the 
higher the insolvency risk. (Figure 3.3) 
V = 1 0 0 , H = 0 . 2 , CT = 0 . 3 , t = 1 
1 1 1 r 1 I I 
0.2- \ 3^=10 \ D,=15 \ D,=20 -
qI 1 1 I ^ ^—~~I~ ~ ~ i " I 
O 0 . 0 5 0 .1 0 . 1 5 0 . 2 0 . 2 5 0 . 3 0 . 3 5 0 . 4 
Liquidity Ratio (c) 
Figure 3.3: Insolvency probability versus liquidity with different debts value 
Assets Value 
Firm assets value fluctuates from day to day due to the daily operation. 
The firm value increases when the daily return is higher than the daily costs 
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(positive net return), or the firm adopts a positive NPV^ investment. While 
the firm value decreases when there is a negative daily net return, or there 
is sudden lost in the investment. As these events cannot be predicted with 
certainty, the movement therefore is a random process. 
The liquid assets value should have the same characteristic as assets value 
because a firm also has daily cash flow in and out. Therefore it is also a 
random process. Once the management sets a liquidity target, the liquid 
asset value can be modelled by the product of liquidity ratio and assets value 
{cV). It is obvious that the higher the assets value, the higher the repayment 
ability is and the lower the insolvency probability is. (Figure 3.4) 
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Figure 3.4: Insolvency probability versus liquidity with different assets value 
^Net Present Value 
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Expected Rate of Assets Return 
Expected rate of assets return is one of the factor that influences the 
future assets value. It represents the expected rate that the firm assets value 
will increase in the future. It is also an indictor of the earning power of the 
firm. The higher the earning power, the higher increase in the future assets 
value. Thus, the insolvency probability decreases when the expected rate 
increases. (Figure 3.5) 
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Figure 3.5: Insolvency probability versus liquidity with different expected 
rate 
Volatility of Assets 
Volatility of the assets is another factor that influences the future assets 
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value. It measures how uncertain about the future assets value movement. 
When a firm adopts a risky project, that is the firm may perform well or 
badly, the uncertainly in the future return increases. And this uncertainly 
will affect the debts repayment ability. 
Generally, if the firm value is sufficiently high, insolvency risk is low. The 
increase in volatility will increase the insolvency risk. On the other case, if 
the firm value is in a dangerous position, the dropped value becomes limited. 
The increase in volatility may increase the possibility that the firm has a 
dramatic increment and leads to the decrease of insolvency risk. (Figure 3.6) 
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Figure 3.6: Insolvency probability versus volatility with different assets value 
Time to Maturity 
All debts have maturities. As time is going by, the time to maturity 
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decreases accordingly. If the firm has already prepared sufficient liquid assets 
to repay the debts, the decrease in time to maturity reduces the uncertainly 
and the insolvency risk decreases. On the other hand, the decrease in time 
to maturity increases the insolvency risk if the firm is unlikely to prepare the 
sufficient liquid assets in the coming future. (Figure 3.7) 
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Figure 3.7: Insolvency probability versus time to maturity with different 
assets value 
To conclude, our model measures the insolvency probability by examin-
ing the liquidity sources (liquid assets) and the liquidity requirements (short-
term debts value). Importantly, it captures the random characteristic (assets 
value, expected rate of return, volatility) of liquidity and measures by a going-
concern basis (time to maturity). The effect of those factors are summarized 
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on Table 3.1. 
Variable Increase c Ds V fi a t 
Insolvency Probability (p) i T I i ? ? 
Table 3.1: Summary of factors affecting insolvency probability 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have derived the insolvency probability that a firm has 
insufficient liquid assets to repay the short-term debts. This measurement is 
more effective than traditional financial ratios analysis because it accounts 
for all the factors that affect a firm's liquidity. The model assists the external 
credit analysts when assessing firm creditworthiness, as it directly reflects the 
liquidity risk of the firm. On the other hand, the model also assists internal 
treasurers in determining the firm's target liquidity position. 
Chapter 4 
Profitability, Liquidity and 
Insolvency 
In previous chapter, we have shown that if a firm aims at minimizing its 
insolvency probability, the firm should hold as much liquid assets as possible. 
However, as shown in the previous model, offsetting costs of holding liquid 
assets has been ignored. 
A formal analysis requires careful consideration of both the benefits and 
costs of holding liquid assets. Investment in liquid assets is costly because the 
firm foregoes investment in less liquid but more profitable long-term assets, 
such as, production equipments. 
In this chapter, we first analyze the relationships between profitability 
and liquidity. Then, combining the results in Chapter 3, we modify the 
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insolvency probability by incorporating the effect of profitability. 
4.1 Profitability and Liquidity 
A firm objective is always to maximize its wealth. On the other hand, liq-
uidity management has generally been considered relatively unimportant in 
the firm objectives, particularly to the value maximization. The theoretical 
finance literature has virtually ignored liquidity management in the valuation 
process. 
Such a view of the irrelevance of liquidity management to value maxi-
mization is shortsighted, since liquid assets and short-term liabilities have 
direct influences on the firm value. When these assets and liabilities are var-
ied, profitability and risk of the firm are often affected. Excessive investment 
in liquid assets ties up capital that can be productively used elsewhere. How-
ever, too little investment in liquid assets can also be expensive and risky. If a 
firm does not maintain, or is unable to generate, a satisfactory level of liquid 
assets, it is likely to become insolvent and may be forced into bankruptcy. 
Therefore, profitability and liquidity are closely related. 
To measure firm's profitability, we use the Return on Assets (ROA) ratio. 
It is defined as net income divided by total assets. It measures how well a 
firm management team doing their job. The ROA ratio reveals how much 
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income, management has been able to earn, from each dollar's worth of a 
firm assets. 
The advantage of ROA is that it captures the efficiency of management 
use firm assets independent of the firm's capital structure and size. This is 
in contract to Return on Equity (ROE)\ which evaluates both operational 
performance and capital structure. 
The other reason of using ROA is that it can be expressed as a sum of 
liquid assets productivity and illiquid assets productivity, that is 
Total Assets x ROA = Liquid Assets x Return on Liquid Assets 
+ Illiquid Assets x Return on Illiquid Assets. 
Similar as ROA, Return on Liquid Assets and Return on Illiquid Assets 
are defined as net income generated by liquid (illiquid) assets divided by 
liquid (illiquid) assets value. Rewriting it using our notations, we have 
V X Rv 二 c x l / x 凡 + ( l - c ) x V x i ? i 
Rv 二 c x + ( 1 - c ) X Hi (4.1) 
where 
Ry = Return on Assets (ROA), 
Rc 二 Return on Liquid Assets, 
iROE = Net income + Total assets / Returns on sales x Asset turnover x Financial 
leverage 
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Ri = Return on Illiquid Assets. 
Equation (4.1) explains that the profitability of a firm depends on how 
the management allocate the weighting of liquid and illiquid assets, and the 
performance of those assets. 
Generally, return on illiquid assets is always better than return on liquid 
assets (i.e., Ri > Re). It is because illiquid assets is far more productive 
and profitable. They are the foundations of the core business and contribute 
major profits to the firm. On the other hand, liquid assets can only generate 
little profits, more or less the same as risk-free rate, since they are usually 
kept as bank deposits or invested in short-term non-risky bonds. Therefore, 
the more liquid assets the firm holds, the less is the profits. 
Rearrange Equation (4.1) and differentiate with respect to c, 
Rv = Ri-{Ri- Rc)c, 
学=-{Ri - Rc)- (4.2) 
dc 
Equation (4.2) shows that the decreasing rate of the ROA depends on 
the difference between the liquid assets return and illiquid assets return. It 
represents the cost of holding liquid assets. The larger the difference, the 
higher the opportunity cost. 
As a result, we have obtained an inversely linear relationship between 
profitability and liquidity. Management needs to face the tradeoff: high 
profits with low liquidity or low profits with high liquidity. Determining the 
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target liquidity ratio becomes the key decision concerning the insolvency risk 
and profitability of a firm. 
4.2 Modified Insolvency Probability 
As discussed in chapter 3, the expected rate of assets return (/i) of a firm is 
difficult to estimate, because it cannot be observed from the market. There-
fore, we will suggest a method to estimate such parameter, based on the 
relationship of profitability and liquidity. After that, by incorporating the 
result, we will modify the previous insolvency model into a new model. 
Expected rate of assets return (/z) represents the expected rate that the 
firm assets value will increase in the future. In continuous measurement, a 
firm assets follows geometric Brownian motion (Equation (3.1)). Therefore, 
the expected value at time t is 
E{Vt) = (4.3) 
However, /i is a continuous parameter and it is difficult to be measured 
and estimated. 
On the other hand, Return on Assets {Ry) is a profitability indicator, 
measuring how much a firm earns on each dollar of the assets in a year. 
With the assumption that there is no re-financing within the horizon (t), 
the expected return of a firm should be equal to the expected net income 
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generated, therefore 
E(Vt) = Vil + Rvt). (4.4) 
At the same time, Equation (4.3) and Equation (4.4) must be equal. Thus 
e " = (1 + Rvt) 
fi = +Rvt) 
t 
= i In [1 + (i^ - (•Ri - Rc)c)t]. (4.5) 
If 
Therefore, can be expressed in term of liquidity ratio (c), liquid assets 
return (i?c), illiquid assets return (Ri) and time horizon {t). There are two 
advantages in this expression. 
The first advantage is the these four parameters are more easy to be 
estimated. Liquidity ratio is the target liquidity level that decided by the 
management. Liquid/illiquid assets returns are the expected net income 
generated from the operations. Once these three parameters are set and 
forecasted, with time horizon, fi can be determined. 
The second advantage is this is more meaningful and understandable. 
The expected rate of firm assets return is based on the how the management 
allocate the weighting of liquid and illiquid assets, the performance of those 
assets and the time horizon. It represents a relationship between profitability 
and liquidity. 
At a result, using this expression, we have figured out the relationship 
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between profitability and liquidity and provided a convenience method to 
estimate fi. 
As stated before, when a firm's liquidity is varied, profitability and risk 
are also affected. The liquidity ratio not only influences the expected return, 
but also the insolvency probability. In our previous insolvency model, the 
relationship between profitability and liquidity is not encountered. 
Therefore, a modified insolvency probability (p') is proposed by substi-
tuting Equation (4.5) into equation (3.3), that is 
, r I n f + + 
P = N _ h . 
- I n 爭 + ln(l + i V ) — T力] / � 
= N ——^ L (4.6) 
G\Ji 
where Ry = Ri — {Ri — Rc)c. 
The difference between modified insolvency probability (p') and original 
insolvency probability (p) is that the expected profits {Ry) depended on the 
firm's liquidity (c) is incorporated. As the liquidity increases, the expected 
profits decreases accordingly. Therefore, the effect of liquidity to insolvency 
probability is different from the previous model, see Figure 4.1. 
By taking the first derivative and the second derivative with respect to c, 
we have, 
楚 = _ ! M {Ri-Rc)t\ (4 7) 
dc ay/t \c 1 + Ryt ) 
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Figure 4.1: Modified Insolvency probability versus liquidity with different 
illiquid assets return 
^ = 'n[d] f , f l (Ri-Rc)tY (1 ({Ri-Rc)tyY\ 
— - [p御 Vc " 1 + Rvi ) 一、？ V 1 + Rvt J 人 
(4.8) 
Comparing with the first derivative of previous model (Equation 3.4)，the 
decreasing rate of the modified model (Equation 4.7) is smaller as liquidity 
increases. When a firm increases its liquidity, it forgoes investment in high 
profitable illiquid assets, reducing its earning power. Thus, the modified 
insolvency probability tends to decreases at a slower rate. 
The significant of the modified insolvency probability is that it incorpo-
rates the profitability in the liquidity measurement. Our model indicates 
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that liquidity is an essential factor that influences both profitability and in-
solvency risk of a firm. Therefore, the model becomes more realistic and 
practical for liquidity measurement. 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have developed a model to capture the relationship among 
profitability, liquidity and insolvency risk. We first indicated the expected 
profits is a dependent on liquidity. Then combining the result in Chapter 
3，we have modified the insolvency probability by incorporating such factor. 
And we figured out that liquidity is a key factor in determining both the 
profitability and insolvency of a firm. By do so, our model becomes more 
realistic and practical for liquidity measurement. 
Chapter 5 
Decision on Optimal Liquidity 
Level 
In last chapter, we have shown that profitability, liquidity and insolvency are 
highly correlated. There is a tradeoff between profitability and insolvency 
risk, in which liquidity is the determining factor. 
A firm's objectives are always to maximize return and minimize risks. The 
determination of the appropriate liquidity level becomes a critical decision 
to the management. 
Therefore, we are going to formulate an optimization model to solve for 
the optimal liquidity level of a firm, by examining the expected assets return 
and the expected loss in case of insolvency. 
39 
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5.1 Expected Loss in case of Insolvency 
In previous chapters, we measure the liquidity risk using insolvency prob-
ability. However, such a measurement may not be easy to be understood 
by management. It is because probability is something unobservable. What 
they concern is the exact amount of loss if insolvency occurs. Therefore, we 
will re-formulate the liquidity risk using Expected Loss in case of Insolvency 
剛 ) • 
Once a firm is insolvent, that is running out of liquid assets, it suffers loss. 
The loss are due to lost sales, lost customers and disruption of production 
schedules since the firm has insufficient liquid assets to carry on its daily 
operations. 
If the firm does not have sufficient liquid assets to repay its obligations, it 
may be forced to sell its high profitable illiquid assets. In this case, additional 
loss is suffered even the firm could escape from bankruptcy. It is because 
illiquid assets can only be sold at discounts, instead of purchasing prices. 
Besides, selling illiquid assets means forgoing the firm's earning power. 
Therefore, the loss in case of insolvency is in proportional to illiquid as-
sets value. We define such proportion by a constant Losing Rate (LR). Such 
losing rate may be different from firm to firm, depending on its character-
izes. For example, for a manufacturing firm, the losing rate is higher since 
manufacturing equipment suffers a higher discounts when sold. 
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The expected loss in case of insolvency E{Lt) measures the amount of loss 
a firm will suffer if there is insufficient liquid assets to repay its short-term 
debts at the maturity. It is calculated by multiplying 
1. Expected amount of illiquid assets (1 — c)E(Vf); 
2. Losing Rate LR\ and 
3. Modified insolvency probability p'. 
That is, 
E{Lt) = (1 - c)E(Vt) xLRxp' 
=LRxV{l-^Rvt){l-c)p'. (5.1) 
And the first derivative and the second derivative with respect to c are 
学=LR X y [(1 + ((1 - c)f - p') + - cy 
dc \ ac J ac 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
The above equations indicate that as a firm increases its liquidity, the 
expected insolvency loss decreases gradually. And a firm with large amount 
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of liquid assets can reduce the possibility of insolvency and, as the same time, 
the expected loss. 
Another factor we should concern is the losing rate. The losing rate 
reflects the discount rate of the illiquid assets of a firm. The higher the 
discount rate, the more loss the firm will be suffered if insolvency occurs. 
(Figure 5.1) 
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Figure 5.1: Expected loss versus liquidity with different losing rate 
Comparing with insolvency probability, the main advantage of modelling 
the expected insolvency loss is that it is more easy for management to under-
stand and measure the liquidity risk of the firm. As it is measured in terms of 
dollars units, management can decide the firm's target liquidity level based 
on their acceptance insolvency loss amount. 
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5.2 Optimal Liquidity Level 
The most fundamental objective of liquidity management is to prevent cor-
porate from insolvency. However, from a corporate perspective, value max-
imization is also very important. Thus, the two goals are closely related, in 
which liquidity level plays an essential role. 
As we have shown before, high liquidity results in low insolvency risk 
and low return, while low liquidity results in high insolvency risk and high 
return. Thus, two corporate objectives are in conflict to each other, but 
highly correlated in term of liquidity. Therefore, it is a headache problem for 
management to decide the firm's target liquidity level. 
In order to support the management's decision on liquidity, we first define 
a function which incorporates the trade-off of holding liquid assets, with both 
the benefits and costs. And then using optimization technique, we can figure 
out the optimal liquidity level of the firm. 
Traditional firm's value maximization method usually ignored the costs 
of liquidity. High liquidity results in the cost of forgoing investment in high 
profitability illiquid assets. On the other hand, low liquidity results in the 
cost of suffering insolvency loss. 
Thus, we will incorporate both these costs in our model. We define a 
function, Expected Return with Liquidity Adjustment (ERLA) or F(c), There 
are two components in the function: 
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1. Expected return of the firm assets E{Rt)] 
2. Expected loss in case of insolvency E{Lt). 
The expected return of the firm assets E{Rt) is measured as the expected 
assets increased with the rate Ry in a given time period t, that is 
E{Rt) = V xRvXt 
=V[Ri -{Ri- Rc)c]t. (5.4) 
With first derivative and second derivative 
= -V{H, - (5.5) ac 
響 = 0 . (5.6) 
As defined in Chapter 4, Ry is the net income generated by the each dollar 
of firm assets. And it can be expressed as a sum of liquid assets productivity 
[Re] and illiquid assets productivity {Ri). 
E{Rt) measures the expected amount of return based on the allocation 
and performance of liquid/illiquid assets. As illiquid assets are more prof-
itable than liquid assets, a firm with high liquidity results in a low expected 
return. Thus, the expected return is strictly decreasing with the liquidity 
ratio (c). 
Expected loss in case of insolvency E{Lt) has been defined in the last 
section. It measures the loss amount a firm will suffer if there is insufficient 
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liquid assets to repay its short-term debts at the maturity. A firm with high 
liquidity results in a low expected loss. 
In the model, ERLA or F(c), is the difference between the benefits E(Rt) 
and the costs E{Lt) on liquidity, that is 
F{c) = E{Rt)-E{Lt). (5.7) 
The significance of the function is that it incorporates liquidity in deter-
mination of the future firm value. Further more, it encounters the tradeoff 
between profitability and insolvency risk. Thus, when management are de-
ciding a firm's target liquidity level, they should always aim to maximize 
It becomes an optimization problem. The objective is to maximize F[c) 
and the decision variable is the target liquidity ratio c. Therefore, 
maximize F{c) = E{Rt) - E{Lt), 
subject to 0 < c < 1. (5.8) 
Given all the information, we can solve for the optimal liquidity ratio 
(c*). Based on Equations (5.1) and (5.4)，we have 
F{c) = E{Rt) - E{Lt) 
= V T V t — Li? + — c y . (5.9) 
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Take the first and second derivative with respect to c, we have 
dFjc) = dEjRt) dE[U) 
dc dc dc . ‘ 
響 二 - 響 (5.11) 
Thus, we can solve for the Problem (5.8) if we can find an optimal c*, such 
that 
学 = 0 ’ and 
dc 
d � ) < 0， atc = c\ 
Due to the complexity of the problem, a closed form solution cannot be 
obtained. However, we may apply line search method, for example Fibonacci 
algorithm^ to determine the optimal c*. 
Since F{c) is a unimodal in 0 < c* < 1, it has only one maximum point in 
(0,1). Using Fibonacci algorithm, it is clear that by repeating evaluate the 
function at two interior points, we can locate the maximum in a subinterval 
of (0,1). 
5.3 Numerical Example 
By considering the example of a firm with assets of $100M, an assets volatility 
of 30 percent and short-term debts of $15M due in one year. The management 
1 Details of the algorithm are presented in Appendix A 
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estimates that the expected annual profits form its illiquid assets and liquid 
assets are 30 percent and 5 percent respectively. In case of insolvency, the 
firm will suffer a 30 percent discount in proportional to illiquid assets value. 
The management now is deciding its optimal target liquidity level. 
Prom table 5.1，we notify that when the liquidity ratio increases from 0.0 
to 0.4, the expected return of the firm assets decreases from $30M to $20M, 
as the same time, the expected loss in case of insolvency also decreases from 
$39M to almost $0. 
c 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 
Rv 0.300 0.275 0.250 0.225 0.200 
E(Rt) $30.00M $27.50M $25.00M $22.50M $20.00M 
P2 1.000 0.7554 0.0602 0.0023 0.0001 
E(Lt) $39.00M $26.01M $1.81M $0.059M $0.002M 
F(c) -$9.00M -$1.49M $23.19M $22.44M $19.998M 
Table 5.1: Example of expected return with liquidity adjustment 
The net effect, that is the ERLA or F(c), increases from negative value 
to positive value and then drops gradually after the peak, as the liquidity 
ratio increases. (Figure 5.2) 
For those liquidity levels with negative F(c), the expected insolvency loss 
is higher than expected return. Certainly, it is not a wise decision to adopt 
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such targets. In alternative, management should choose those liquidity levels 
with positive F(c), which is the expected return is higher than expected 
insolvency loss. And there is an optimal liquidity level existed, such that 
F{c) is maximum. 
In this example, the optimal liquidity ratio is 22.68 percent, that is 
$22.68M out of $100M of the total assets. In this liquidity level, the in-
solvency probability is 2.53 percent. The expected return is $24.33M and 
the expected loss in case of insolvency is $0.73M. And ERLA is $23.6M. 
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Figure 5.2: Expected return with liquidity adjustment versus liquidity 
To conclude, by introducing the expected return with liquidity adjust-
ment (ERLA), that is F(c), both the benefits and costs on liquidity are 
encountered. Based on the model, management can determinate a firm's 
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optimal liquidity level using optimization technique. 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have first transformed the liquidity risk into dollars units, 
so that it is more meaningful and understandable to management. After that, 
we have introduced the expected return with liquidity adjustment, which 
measures both the benefits and cost on liquidity. Further more, using opti-
mization technics, an optimal liquidity level can be figured out. 
Chapter 6 
Liquidity Strategies 
As we have discussed in the previous chapter, management should adopt the 
optimal liquidity ratio so as to maximize the liquidity adjusted return. How-
ever, it is not guaranteed that the firm can totally escaping from insolvency, 
even the insolvency probability is low. 
Future is full of uncertainly. The economic conditions and the firm itself 
may suffer unexpected events, leading to risk increment. 
Therefore, we propose some liquidity strategies for management. The 
main idea is there should be some on-going strategies to monitor the liquidity 
position of a firm. In addition, we will carry some simulation tests to examine 
the effects of these strategies. 
50 
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6.1 Liquidity Strategies 
Over the course of its operations, a firm's assets level fluctuates, rasing as 
operations gear up for sales growth and then subsiding as sales falls. At 
the same time, cash has been collected and disbursed resulting in a daily 
ending cash position that may be positive or negative. As sales grows, cash 
received overcome cash disbursed, daily cash position becomes positive and 
the total liquid assets increases. As sales falls, cash received cannot cover 
cash disbursed, daily cash position becomes negative and the total liquid 
assets decreases. Thus, the daily fluctuation of liquid assets position results 
in movement of insolvency probability. 
The optimal liquidity ratio suggested in Chapter 5 is the optimal given all 
the current information. However, it cannot be guaranteed a firm from to-
tally escaping the future insolvency risk. When there is economic downturn, 
a firm's liquid assets level may contract continuously because of negative 
daily cash position. In this case, the insolvency probability increases gradu-
ally and the firm may suffer insolvency at maturity. In order to prevent from 
such scenario, management should evaluate and make possible adjustments 
to the liquidity position continuously. 
There are three basic liquidity strategies that the management can choose 
after the optimal liquidity ratio is adopted at the beginning of the horizon. 
The three strategies are: 
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1. Conservative strategy; 
2. Aggressive strategy; 
3. Moderate strategy. 
Conservative Strategy 
The conservative strategy is basically to do nothing and wait until the 
maturity. After the optimal liquidity is set at the beginning, management 
assume the future movement will follow their expectations, that is, the firm 
will receive the expected profits and insolvency probability is small enough 
to be ignored. The only benefit is that no extra effort is paid for evaluation 
and adjustment. This strategy is workable only with precise estimation and 
expectation. However, once the real situation is out of the expectation, the 
payoff may be serious. 
Aggressive Strategy 
In contract to conservative strategy, aggressive strategy is to do as much 
as management can. After the optimal liquidity is set at the beginning, 
management evaluate and adjust the optimal liquidity position at the start 
of every time-period. The time-period can be one day, one week or one 
month, depending on the preference of the management. The advantage is 
that management can capture most recent financial and liquidity position of 
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the firm, so that they can make optimal decisions dynamically. While liquid 
assets level grows excessively, management can purchase more illiquid assets 
so as to earn extra profits. On the other hand, once liquid assets level falls 
sharply, management can sell illiquid assets to reduce insolvency risk. How-
ever, frequently change of liquidity level may result in high transaction costs 
and confusion to the employees. Therefore, to adopt this strategy, manage-
ment should not choose a time-period that is too short. 
Moderate Strategy 
The moderate strategy is a blend of the extreme strategies represented by 
the conservative and aggressive strategies discussed above. The management 
adopting moderate strategy evaluate the liquidity position at the start of 
every time-period and adjust only when necessary. The management can 
choose an acceptance region (upper bound and lower bound) of insolvency 
risk. At the start of every time-period, management evaluate the insolvency 
probability (or expected loss). Once the insolvency probability rises above or 
drops below the boundaries, an adjustment is made such that the insolvency 
probability restores within the pre-set acceptance region. The advantage is 
that it can continuously monitor the liquidity position with limited costs. 
The critical point are the chosen of the time-period and the acceptance 
region. A short time-period represents a high frequency of the evaluations, 
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therefore the most recent financial and liquidity position could be examined. 
If the volatility, that is the fluctuation rate, of the current assets value is 
high, management should adopt a shorter time-period, such that they can 
response to the sudden crisis at once. However, the side effect is it will be 
time- and cost-consuming for frequent evaluations. 
The acceptance region indicates the risk preference of the management. 
A risk-averse management should choose a narrow boundaries, such that 
they can control their liquidity risks more easily. However, it may increase 
the number of adjustments and increase the transaction costs. By narrowing 
down the boundaries, the moderate strategy will approach to become the 
aggressive strategy. 
6.2 Scenario Tests 
As we have mentioned, different liquidity strategies have different benefits 
and costs. In order to examine the effects of those strategies, we carry sce-
nario tests by stimulations. 
By considering the example in chapter 5，the optimal liquidity ratio cal-
culated is 22.68 percent, with 2.53 percent of insolvency probability. And we 
simulate the movement of the assets value V (Equation 3.1)，with expected 
return rate of 24.33 percent and volatility of 30 percent, from one year before 
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the debt maturity to the date of maturity (360 days). 
In addition, we examine the liquidity changes and insolvency probability 
changes under three liquidity strategies. The evaluation time-period is 30 
days. Strategies 1, 2 and 3 represent conservative, aggressive and moderate 
strategy respectively. 
For strategy 1，the liquidity level is kept at 22.68 percent through out 
the time horizon. For strategy 2，the liquidity level is optimized at the start 
of each time-period. For strategy 3，the liquidity level is evaluated at the 
start of each time-period and makes adjustment only when the insolvency 
probability rises over 5 percent or drops below 0.5 percent. 
We would like to examine the effects of these strategies in different sit-
uations. We have carried three scenario tests. Each scenario represents the 
firm assets value fluctuates with different trends: normal condition, upward 
trend and downward trend. (The statistic results are shown in Appendix B.) 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 1 (Figure 6.1) represents the normal condition. The daily firm 
assets value fluctuates up and down normally. 
The result show that strategy 1 always has more liquid assets with a very 
low insolvency probability. Although strategy 3 has a comparatively high 
insolvency probability, it is under control. Six adjustments are made. 
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Figure 6.1: Scenario Test 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 2 (Figure 6.2) represents the upward trend. The firms perform 
very well and the firm's financial conditions increases gradually. 
The result is similar to scenario 1，strategy 1 always have more liquid 
assets than the others. And all strategies have a low insolvency probabilities. 
Seven adjustments are made in strategy 3. 
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Figure 6.2: Scenario Test 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 (Figure 6.3) represents the downward trend. The firm performs 
badly and the firm's financial conditions becomes worse and worse. 
The result indicates that strategy 1 always has less liquid assets than the 
others. Finally, it suffers insolvency. As strategies 2 and 3 have increased the 
liquid ratio from 22.68 percent to 34.29 percent, they do not suffer insolvency. 
And only four adjustments are made in strategy 3. 
The general conclusion of the scenario tests is that conservative strategy 
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Figure 6.3: Scenario Test 3 
has the poorest performance in monitoring the liquidity risk. Comparing 
with the other two strategies, it always holds excess liquidity when the risk 
is low and insufficient liquidity when the risk is high. Besides, the firm 
triggers insolvent in a downward trend scenario. 
The advantage of aggressive strategy if that it can best track the liquidity 
fluctuation. However, the implementation may be complex and involved 
transaction costs may be huge. 
In contrast, moderate strategy is more practical since it can eliminate the 
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weaknesses of the other two strategies. It tracts the liquidity movement well 
and involves less transaction costs. Besides, it is more flexible as management 
can decide its own accepted risk boundaries. 
At a result, by examining the effects of these strategies in different scenar-
ios, we suggest management to adopt the moderate strategy in monitoring a 
firm's liquidity risk continuously. 
6.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have discussed three liquidity strategies for management 
in monitoring a firm'a liquidity continuously. The three strategies are con-
servative, aggressive and modern strategies. We have also examined their 
effects in three scenarios using simulation technique. And we concluded that 
moderate strategy is the most efficient and practical one. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
This thesis introduced a new liquidity measurement, insolvency probability, 
to replace the traditional financial ratios. Insolvency probability is a going-
concern and forward looking measurement. It captures all the factors that 
influence the short-term debts repayment ability of a firm. Therefore, it 
facilitates credit analysts and internal treasurers to measure a firm's liquidity 
risk precisely and accurately. 
Another contribution of this thesis is that we captured the relationship 
between probability and insolvency risk in term of liquidity. By introducing a 
new concept, Expected Return with Liquidity Adjustment (ERLA), our model 
has the capability to take both the benefits and costs of holding liquid as-
sets in consideration. Further more, using optimization technics, an optimal 
liquidity level can be figured out. Therefore, using our model, management 
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can determine a firm's target liquidity level, which maximizes ERLA. 
Finally, by suggesting three liquidity strategies and carrying out the sce-
nario analysis, we concluded that management should adopt the moderate 
strategy in monitoring a firm's liquidity position continuously so as to min-
imize the liquidity risk. However, our analysis was based on a few assump-
tions, such as, no transaction cost, therefore, more research can be done in 
the future to take such factors into consideration. 
To conclude, we have provided a new aspiration in measuring, handling 
and monitoring liquidity risk in this thesis. 
Appendix A 
Fibonacci Algorithm 
Fibonacci numbers are defined by 
Fi+i = Fi + Fi_i’i = l，2… (A.l) 
where 
i^ o = i^ i = 1 
The sequence are 1’ 1，2，3，5’ 8, 13, 21, 34.... 
Assume that we know a minimizer x* of f{x) is located in the interval 
a,b], and suppose that f{x) is decreasing for a < a; < a;* and increasing for 
h> x> X* (the function is called unimodal over [a,6]). 
Let the current interval be [a^ , k] and let the points at which f is evaluated 
be x\ and x^ where x\ < x\. For i = 1, ai = a, bi = b. 
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Let N be the preset number of function evaluations. At iteration z, 
x\ = ^^^{bi - ai)ai, (A.2) 
^N-i+l 
4 = + (A.3) 
^N-i+l 
where i = 1,2，...，N. 
1. If / ( 4 ) > f {x\l 
& � = 4 , 
2. ii f{4) < f{x\), 
a�+i = 
We have 
— a…=4 -ai = bi- x\ = -^^{bi — ai) 
So after N -1 evaluations, the length of the interval is 
. F n - i F n - 2 F3F2 , 2(bi — ai) 
^ = i ： ^ …瓦瓦 ( � — a i ) = 
Fibonacci algorithm is optimum in the sense that it gives the largest ratio 
of initial to final interval for a fixed number of function evaluations. 
Appendix B 
Stimulation Results 
Table B.l, B.2 and B.3 present the statical results of the stimulation of the 
three liquidity strategies in three scenarios. 
Strategies 1，2 and 3 represent conservative, aggressive and moderate 
strategy respectively. Scenario 1, 2 and 3 represents the firm assets value 
fluctuates with different trends: normal condition, upward trend and down-
ward trend. 
The tables show the assets value {Vt), the liquidity ratios (c) and modified 
insolvency probabilities (p') under each strategy, with a time-period {t) of 
each 30 days. 
64 
APPENDIX B. STIMULATION RESULTS 65 
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Time t Vt Adjustment c p' c p' c p' 
t = 0 100.00 0.2268 0.0253 0.2268 0.0253 0.2268 0.0253 
t = 30 88.14 Before 0.2268 0.0598 0.2268 0.0595 0.2268 0.0595 
After Nil 0.2540 0.0265 0.2540 0.0265 
t = 60 99.44 Before 0.2268 0.0214 0.2540 0.0094 0.2540 0.0094 
After Nil 0.2335 0.0199 Nil 
t = 90 116.51 Before 0.2268 0.0036 0.2335 0.0017 0.2540 0.0006 
After Nil 0.1934 0.0127 0.1934 0.0127 
t = 120 140.75 Before 0.2268 0.0002 0.1934 0.0013 0.1934 0.0013 
After Nil 0.1652 0.0085 0.1652 0.0085 
t = 150 126.66 Before 0.2268 0.0005 0.1652 0.0300 0.1652 0.0300 
After Nil 0.1867 0.0085 Nil 
t = 180 114.02 Before 0.2268 0.0014 0.1867 0.0156 0.1652 0.0560 
After Nil 0.1993 0.0070 0.1993 0.0070 
t = 210 107.25 B e f o r e 0 . 2 2 6 8 0.0019 0.1993 0.0111 0.1993 0.0111 
After Nil 0.2093 0.0057 Nil 
t = 2 4 0 1 1 4 . 1 4 Before 0.2268 0.0002 0.2093 0.0013 0.1993 0.0031 
After Nil 0.1975 0.0037 0.1975 0.0037 
t = 270 108.35 B e f o r e 0 . 2 2 6 8 0.0002 0.1975 0.0053 0.1975 0.0053 
After Nil 0.2054 0.0024 Nil 
t = 300 124.49 B e f o r e 0 . 2 2 6 8 0.0000 0.2054 0.0000 0.1975 0.0000 
After Nil 0.1698 0.0010 0.1698 0.0010 
t = 330 101.55 B e f o r e 0 . 2 2 6 8 0.0000 0.1698 0.0211 0.1698 0.0211 
After Nil 0.1907 0.0004 Nil 
t = 3 6 0 8 8 . 1 4 0.2268 0.0000 0.1907 0.0000 0.1698 0.0000 
Table B.l: Stimulated results of Scenario 1 
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Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Time t Vt Adjustment c p' c p' c p' 
t = 0 100.00 0.2268 0.0253 0.2268 0.0253 0.2268 0.0253 
t = 30 101.89 Before 0.2268 0.0197 0.2268 0.0197 0.2268 0.0197 
After Nil 0.2285 0.0224 Nil 
t = 60 126.15 Before 0.2268 0.0019 0.2285 0.0019 0.2268 0.0019 
After Nil 0.1872 0.0143 0.1872 0.0143 
t = 90 109.91 Before 0.2268 0.0068 0.1872 0.0469 0.1872 0.0143 
After Nil 0.2141 0.0148 Nil 
t = 120 115.37 Before 0.2268 0.0029 0.2141 0.0053 0.1872 0.0215 
After Nil 0.2000 0.0111 Nil 
t = 150 126.67 Before 0.2268 0.0005 0.2000 0.0025 0.1872 0.0057 
After Nil 0.1822 0.0079 Nil 
t = 180 131.18 Before 0.2268 0.0001 0.1822 0.0044 0.1872 0.0030 
After Nil 0.1781 0.0060 0.1781 0.0060 
t = 210 137.57 Before 0.2268 0.0000 0.1781 0.0013 0.1781 0.0013 
After Nil 0.1654 0.0041 0.1654 0.0041 
t = 240 152.41 Before 0.2268 0.0000 0.1654 0.0003 0.1654 0.0003 
After Nil 0.1488 0.0025 0.1488 0.0025 
t = 270 156.49 Before 0.2268 0.0000 0.1488 0.0005 0.1421 0.0005 
After Nil 0.1421 0.0015 0.1421 0.0015 
t = 300 170.65 B e f o r e 0 . 2 2 6 8 0.0000 0.1421 0.0000 0.1421 0.0000 
After Nil 0.1257 0.0007 0.1257 0.0007 
t = 330 159.93 Before 0.2268 0.0000 0.1257 0.0005 0.1257 0.0005 
After Nil 0.1278 0.0002 0.1278 0.0002 
t = 360 166.55 0.2268 0.0000 0.1278 0.0000 0.1278 0.0000 
Table B.2: Stimulated results of Scenario 2 
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Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Time t Vt Adjustment c p' c p' c p' 
t = 0 100.00 0.2268 0.0253 0.2268 0.0253 0.2268 0.0253 
t = 30 93.08 Before 0.2268 0.0404 0.2268 0.0404 0.2268 0.0404 
After Nil 0.2432 0.0247 Nil 
t = 60 95.09 Before 0.2268 0.0313 0.2285 0.0154 0.2268 0.0313 
After Nil 0.2356 0.0202 Nil 
t = 90 85.54 Before 0.2268 0.0662 0.2356 0.0504 0.2268 0.0662 
After Nil 0.2629 0.0204 0.2629 0.0204 
t = 120 81.58 Before 0.2268 0.0890 0.2629 0.0304 0.2629 0.0304 
After Nil 0.2775 0.0184 Nil 
t = 150 75.61 Before 0.2268 0.1472 0.2775 0.0188 0.2629 0.0321 
After Nil 0.2830 0.0154 Nil 
t = 180 74.70 Before 0.2268 0.1566 0.2830 0.0226 0.2629 0.0477 
After Nil 0.2972 0.0130 Nil 
t = 210 70.16 Before 0.2268 0.2397 0.2972 0.0267 0.2629 0.0939 
After Nil 0.3194 0.0109 0.3194 0.0109 
t = 240 75.11 Before 0.2268 0.1364 0.3194 0.0019 0.3194 0.0019 
After Nil 0.2964 0.0067 0.2964 0.0067 
t = 270 70.73 Before 0.2268 0.2218 0.2964 0.0059 0.2964 0.0059 
After Nil 0.3014 0.0043 Nil 
t = 300 61.76 Before 0.2268 0.6133 0.3014 0.0287 0.2964 0.0386 
After Nil 0.3363 0.0027 Nil 
t = 330 56.61 Before 0.2268 0.9423 0.3363 0.0019 0.2964 0.0736 
After Nil 0.3429 0.0009 0.3429 0.0009 
t = 360 52.83 0.2268 1.0000 0.3429 0.0000 0.3429 0.0000 
Table B.3: Stimulated results of Scenario 3 
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